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Introduction
This number of the Savage Minds Occasional Paper Series features Ruth Benedict's 
“anthropology and the humanities.” This piece is the published version of the lecture Benedict 
delivered for her presidential address at the annual meeting of the American Anthropological 
association in 1947. In this piece, one of the last she wrote before she passed away, she argues 
that anthropologists can benefit from drawing on the methods of the humanities in addition to 
scientific methods. Benedict's argument is worth examining in its own terms, but it is also worth 
reading between the lines of her essay. In making her case for the humanities, Benedict implicitly 
describes anthropology’s core values. This piece is valuable, then, not only for its argument 
about the humanities, but because it gives us a summary of what one of our foundational figures 
considered the essence of anthropology to be.
This piece is typical Benedict, especially in its sparkling lucidity. Like Kroeber, Benedict 
draws on a notion of the ‘human sciences’ developed by Dilthey. This notion emphasizes that the 
humanities have a unique subject matter, the human mind or spirit. This is quite different from 
the neokantian approach of Sapir and Boas, who saw anthropology as a ‘historical science’ of the 
particular. The argument is also typical, even emblematic, of Benedict's own personal position 
regarding what anthropology is or should be. Typically, Benedict saw anthropology in both 
‘tender’ and ‘tough’ minded terms - a discipline that was both rigorous and objective, yet 
simultaneously subjective and sensitive to the emotions of others. She believed the goal of 
anthropology was to "arrive at objective, theoretical, generalized descriptions of reality." But at 
the same time, she believed anthropology required a deeply subjective experience: “an intense 
cross-cultural experience” which allows one to “move intellectually in a culture different from 
the one in which he had been reared.” 
Benedict argues that good methods involve “surrender to the text itself” and “sensitivities” to 
“the quality of men’s minds and emotions.” This openness to others requires one to “engage in 
conversation,” literally, with the people you study. Montaigne, for instance,"used an informant 
and compared cultures without weighing his argument in favor of his own ethnocentric 
attitudes". But at the same time she argues for “methods of impartial inquiry” and “command of 
vast details” of ethnographic facts, being “holistic and always taking account of context”. 
Is Benedict’s version of anthropology impossibly ambitious, a contradiction in terms, a 
summary of our discipline’s deepest held commitments... or a mixture of all of the above? As 
you can see, this piece is worth reading because it forces us to ask these important questions. 
Throughout this piece Benedict is careful to insist that one can appreciate humanism without 
giving up on science. To me, this feels a bit strained. Does Benedict, famously ridiculed by 
Marvin Harris as having abandoned explanation as an analytic goal, really endorse the pursuit of 
hypotheses and generalizations?
Putting her talk in context helps us answer this question. In the late forties, Benedict was 
facing several challenges. Her presidency of the AAAs was an honorary post with little 
institutional power. Indeed, in some ways it was a bit of a consolation prize. Benedict had not 
achieved her goal of succeeding Boas at Columbia. That honor fell to Ralph Linton, whose 
chairmanship was emblematic of the rise of a generation of male anglo-protestant 
anthropologists interested in Doing Science. The early Boasian interest in experimenting with 
what anthropology was or could be, and in cultivating a diverse body of anthropologists to do it, 
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was in decline. Only a few anthropologists of the next generation, such as Sidney Mintz, would 
continue to insist that Benedict was an important theorist.
Given these facts, there is something elegiac about Benedict's speech. Her vision of 
anthropology and the humanities was at the end of its life, not its beginning. The days when 
Kroeber or Weber could end as essay with a quote from Goethe were gone, replaced by what 
Kroeber called the ‘dismal air of social science’.
Humanistic anthropology would have its day in the future, as dissatisfaction with ‘scientific’ 
anthropology grew in the 1960s. But this is a future which Benedict, who died in 1948, would 
not see. Today, Benedict’s version of anthropology has become mainstream and it is the 
advocates of ‘anthropological science’ who see themselves as beleaguered defenders of an 
honorable cause. As these debates continue in the present, then, it behooves us to remember their 
origin in the past.
❀
This version of “Anthropology and the Humanities” has been cut to down to 3900 words, six 
hundred words shorter than the original 4500. It is not pleasant to cut such an excellent writer 
and I’d urge anyone interested in reading the entire essay to download the full version, which is 
linked to on the third page of this document. Cuts have been made to reduce redundant phrasing, 
and in a few cases paragraphs have been removed. My goal has been, first, to create a document 
that can be taught in a single session alongside another, longer piece by Benedict; and secondly, 
to draw attention to the original document. 
I hope that this paper, like the others in this series, will help present early anthropological 
theory in a form that is accessible to everyone. There is today a tremendous amount of material 
which is open access, but it is difficult to find, inconvenient to read, and many people do not 
know where to start looking for it. By curating a selection of important open access work, I hope 
to make open access resources better known and to raise awareness of the actual history of 
anthropological theory.
-R
20 Dec 2013
Honolulu
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Anthropology and the Humanities
By Ruth Benedict
Anthropology belongs among the sciences in far more senses than the obvious one that it sits 
on the National Research Council and on the Social Science Research Council. From its 
professional beginnings about a hundred years ago it has phrased the problems it investigated 
according to patterns which belong to the scientific tradition. It borrowed some of its early 
concepts, such as that of evolution, directly from phylogenetic concepts of biology, and it has 
attempted to arrive at objective, theoretical, generalized descriptions of reality. The situation is 
quite different in regard to anthropology and the humanities. They are so far apart that it is still 
quite possible to ignore even the fact that they deal with the same subject matter -- man and his 
works and his ideas and his history. To my mind the very nature of the problems posed in the 
humanities is closer, chapter by chapter, to those in anthropology than are the investigations 
carried on in most of the social sciences. This is a heretical statement and to justify it I must turn 
back to the great days of the humanities.
From the Renaissance down to a hundred years ago, the humanities, not the sciences, were 
the intellectual food of western civilization. Humanitas meant then, as it meant to Cicero, the 
knowledge of what man is -- his powers, his relations to his fellows and to nature, and the 
knowledge of the limits of these human powers and of man’s responsibility. It was in this field of 
the Study of Man that, after the Renaissance, methods of impartial inquiry were developed. One 
has only to read some of Montaigne’s essays to realize their kinship to modern anthropology. 
Montaigne, the humanist, in his accounts of his conversations with his Tupinamba servant, could 
discuss the economics of daily life and the torture and eating of captives in this great South 
American tribe from the point of view of his “boy” who had grown up there; like any modern 
anthropological fieldworker, he used an informant and compared cultures without weighting his 
argument in favor of his own ethnocentric attitudes. However slight the attempt he made in the 
primitive field, it belongs in the modern anthropological tradition.
This general statement of the common subject matter of the humanities and of anthropology 
still does not do justice to their likenesses. The humanities provided Europeans with experience 
in cultures other than their own. Because Greece and Rome were the prime inspiration of the 
Renaissance, learning tended to be justified by the freedom it gave the scholar to move 
intellectually in a culture different from the one in which he had been reared. The humanities, in 
consequence, were an intense cross-cultural experience, and their aims were often couched in the 
same phrases as those of modern anthropological investigation of an alien culture. Mill put his 
pleas for the study of the humanities in exactly these terms.
Without knowing some people other than ourselves, we remain, to the hour of our death, with our 
intellects only half expanded; we cannot divest ourselves of preconceived notions. There is no 
means of eliminating their influence but by frequently using the differently colored glasses of 
other people; and those of other nations, as the most different, are the best.
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It was in the humanities that great men for centuries got their cross-cultural insights. It 
liberated them, it taught them discipline of mind. It dominated the intellectual life of the period. 
Then about the middle of the last century the sciences began to take leadership out of the hands 
of the humanists. Professional anthropology had its beginnings during the[se] years. The 
excitement of phrasing the study of man in terms of scientific generalizations was basic in the 
whole discipline of anthropology. There were great gains. But, looking back at it now, there were 
also losses. Such great prescientific compilation as that done by Sahagun among the Aztecs was 
not duplicated by professional anthropologists of the age of Ratzel and Tylor. Instead Spencer 
collected his huge scrapbooks of meager travelers’ items, and Morgan found it possible to 
classify his kinship terminologies without ethnological investigation of the significance of the 
actual relation to forms of marriage or of residence of kin. Professional anthropologists of this 
period did not engage in conversations such as those of Montaigne with his Tupinamba boy; they 
studied marriage or religion or magic in the British Museum without benefit of any informant. 
William James reports that when he asked Frazer about natives he had known, Frazer exclaimed, 
“But Heaven forbid!”
With all this in mind, it is tempting to imagine what struggles need never have occurred in 
later anthropological work and theory if anthropology had originally become a professional study 
before sciences came to dominate the field of intellectual inquiry. It is easy to imagine that 
anthropology might have stemmed from and continued the methods and insights of the 
humanities. No one is more convinced than I am that anthropology has profited by being born 
within the scientific tradition. The humanist tradition did not construct hypotheses about man’s 
cultural life which it then proceeded to test by cross-cultural study. My conviction is simply that 
today the scientific and humanist traditions are not mutually exclusive. They are supplementary, 
and modern anthropology handicaps itself in method and insight by neglecting the work of the 
great humanists.
In the early days of anthropology a great gulf divided it from the humanities. As a young 
scientific discipline anthropology sought to formulate generalizations about social evolution 
which would parallel biology’s phylogenetic tree, or about the psychic unity of man and the vast 
repetitiousness of his behavior. The basic assumption was that human culture could be reduced to 
order by the same kind of concepts which had proved useful in the non-human world. This was a 
reasonable expectation, and those who sought to realize it had good reason to leave out of 
account any consideration of human emotion, ethics, rational insight and purpose which had 
come into being within man’s social life. They abstracted, instead, categories of institutions, and 
discussed them as if they were species in the world of nature. They lifted items of human magic 
and kinship like blocks out of the cultural edifices where these materials had been relevant in 
native life, and classified them as a botanist of the time classified the flowers. Even today, when 
most anthropologists define culture so that it includes human attitudes and behavior, there are 
some who still exclude the mind and purposes of man, and, indeed, a “science of culturology” 
and certain kinds of historical reconstruction and of cultural cycles are at present only possible if 
this exclusion has been made.
The great majority of present-day American anthropologists, however, include the mind of 
man within their definition of culture -- man’s emotions, his rationalizations, his symbolic 
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structures. Such anthropologists’ theoretical interests have moved in the direction of trying to 
understand the relation of man himself to his cultural constructs. They have moved in this 
direction as a consequence of the vivid material available in anthropological field work, and they 
have often not considered sufficiently the difference in training which genuine progress in this 
field requires. For if anthropology studies the mind of man, along with his institutions, our 
greatest resource is the humanities.
The great tradition of the humanities is distinguished by command of vast detail about men’s 
thinking and acting in different periods and places, and the sensitivities it has consequently 
fostered to the quality of men’s minds and emotions. History, as a humanitarian art, left out vital 
economic and political analyses, but it did try to show the deeds and aims of men in a certain 
period and what the consequences of these were; it pictured man as responsible for his successes 
and his failures. Literary criticism might raise the problem of the spirit of the age or confine itself 
to the character of one hero; in either case, it was concerned to show that, given certain specific 
kinds of emotion or of thought, people would act in given ways and the denouement would be of 
a given sort. The humanities have based their work on the premise of man’s creativity and of the 
consequences of his acts and thoughts in his own world. Their methods of study have been 
consistent with their premises.
Both method and premise differ from those of natural science. There the student has to 
analyze the world of nature, which can be described by determinate laws. He has only to find out 
the law of a falling body and he can apply the formula in any context. He can even make large 
generalizations about animals, since they are not biologically specialized to learn and invent. But 
man is a species which can create his way of life, his culture. His social life has developed, for 
good or evil, within a framework of purposes which he has himself invented and espoused. Man 
is a creature with such freedom of action and of imagination that he can, for instance, by not 
accepting a trait, prevent the occurrence of diffusion, or he can at any stage of technological 
development create his gods in the most diverse form. Even granted that many correlations, such 
as that between technological stage and the character of supernatural beings, have high 
probability, it is only to the degree that we know concrete and detailed facts about any people -- 
their contacts with other tribes, their location in a cultural area -- that we can assume the 
correlations to hold.
The gradual recognition of these facts has led anthropologists to include the mind of man 
within their definition of culture. It is my thesis that we can analyze cultural attitudes and be- 
havior more cogently if we know Santayana’s Three Philosophical Poets and Lovejoy’s Great 
Chain of Being and the great works of Shakespearian criticism. I shall assume that we might 
better learn from the great masters than from the lesser and I shall try to illustrate what I believe 
they have to offer.
Santayana, certainly one of the greatest of living humanists, has written in almost all the 
fields of cultural anthropology. He has not dealt with primitive material, but whether his subject 
is Greek or Hebrew civilization, he has dealt with the ways of life men have embodied in their 
cultures, the institutions in which they have expressed them and the kinds of emotion and of 
ideas which have taken root in men so reared. He has constantly illustrated from the side of the 
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humanities and out of his own cultivated sensitivity the truth about culture which he has phrased 
in one of his books:
Any world, any society, any language, satisfies and encourages the spirit which it creates. It fits the 
imagination because it has kindled and moulded it, and it satisfies its resident passions because 
these are such, and such only, as could take root and become habitual in precisely that world. This 
natural harmony between the spirit and its conditions is the only actual one; it is the source of 
every ideal and the sole justification of any hope. Imperfect and shifting as this harmony must be, 
it is sufficient to support the spirit of man.
This fine summary of the interdependence of man’s cultural institutions and of the 
personalities of those who live within their influence is one of Santayana’s great themes. He 
brought all his learning and philosophy to bear against the position that a fundamental opposition 
existed between society and the individual, and that to show man’s debt to his cultural tradition 
was to minimize his claim to originality and free will. Whether Santayana was discussing great 
artists or great religious masters, his thesis was the same: only those “can show great originality 
[who] are trained in distinct and established schools; for originality and genius must be largely 
fed and raised on the shoulders of some old tradition.” The worst conditions for cross-cultural 
understanding, according to Santayana, are present among those who throw over all they regard 
as established tradition; the best, among those who respect their own canons and dogmas. When 
the modern anthropologist says that in any cross-cultural work it is better for the student to be 
sure of his own ethnic and national position and loyalties, he is echoing Santayana’s point, and 
he can profit by his wisdom.
Santayana’s volumes also deal with the subject[s] of anthropology: social organization, 
religion, art and speculative thought. He saw all these arts of man as rooted in the culture of a 
given time and place. His analysis of Greece and that of the Hebrews, and of the growth of 
Christianity in Europe, was a part of his Reason in Religion which was published in 1905. It is 
still indispensable to any anthropologist who is studying religion, and there is no better 
illustration of the deeper insight the methods of the humanities had achieved than a comparison 
of Reason in Religion with Tylor’s Primitive Culture. Tylor performed well the task he set 
himself, but the humanist’s approach to his problem, being holistic and always taking account of 
context in the mind of man, allows him to investigate problems which have not yet been 
adequately treated from anthropological material.
I have stressed Santayana’s humanistic studies of culture, but the humanities do not 
necessarily deal with culture. Shakespearian criticism is a case in point, and it has nevertheless 
been most valuable to me as an anthropologist. Long before I knew anything at all about 
anthropology, I had learned from Shakespearian criticism habits of mind which at length made 
me an anthropologist. I had learned, for example, from Furness’ great Variorum editions, how 
drastically men’s values and judgments are culturally conditioned. The stage versions of 
Shakespeare’s plays rewritten in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries reflected the temper of 
the age of Queen Anne, of the Georges and of the Victorian era. Even the questions critics had 
asked about the characters were documentation of the age in which they were writing; for nearly 
two centuries after Hamlet became a favorite play on the London stage it did not occur to any 
one of them that there was anything particularly interesting in Hamlet’s character. With the rise 
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of romanticism this became the central interest of all commentators, and the most bizarre 
“explanations” were offered.
It was A. C. Bradley who, in his Shakespearian Tragedy, cut his way through this underbrush 
and emphasized valid humanistic standards of criticism as applied not only to the character of 
Hamlet, but of Iago and Macbeth and King Lear. The core of his method was the critic’s 
surrender to the text itself; he ruled out those “explanations” which sounded plausible only so 
long as one did not remember the text. Shakespeare was, for Bradley, a dramatist able to set forth 
his characters with sufficient truth and completeness so that they would reveal themselves to the 
student who weighed carefully both what was said and what was not said, what was done and 
what was not done. In the worlds which Shakespeare portrayed, Bradley said, “We watch what 
is, seeing that so it happened and must have happened.” Bradley’s canons of good Shakespearian 
criticism, and his practice of it, are as good examples of fruitful methods and high standards as a 
student of culture can desire. The anthropologist will, of course, use these canons for the study of 
a cultural ethos, and not for the elucidation of a single character, but he, like Bradley, knows that 
he will succeed in his work if he takes into account whatever is said and done, discarding nothing 
he sees to be relevant; if he tries to understand the interrelations of discrete bits; if he surrenders 
himself to his data and uses all the insights of which he is capable.
The anthropologist has still more to learn from such literary criticism as that of Bradley. For 
more than a decade anthropologists have agreed upon the value of the life history. Very little, 
however, has been done with those which are published, and field workers who collected them 
have most often merely extracted in their topical monographs bits about marriage or ceremonies 
or livelihood. The nature of the life-history material made this largely inevitable, for 80% to 95% 
of most of them are straight ethnographic reporting of culture. It is a time-consuming way of 
obtaining straight ethnography, and if that is all they are to be used for, any field worker knows 
how to obtain such data more economically. The unique value of life histories lies in that fraction 
of the material which shows what repercussions the experiences of a man’s life -- either shared or 
idiosyncratic -- have upon him as a human being moulded in that environment. Such information 
tests out a culture by showing its workings in the life of a carrier of that culture; we can watch in 
an individual case, in Bradley’s words, “what is, seeing that so it happened and must have 
happened.” But if we are to make our collected life histories count in anthropological theory and 
understanding, we have only one recourse: we must be willing and able to study them according 
to the best tradition of the humanities. None of the social sciences, not even psychology, has 
adequate models for such studies. The humanities have.
Shakespearian criticism has pressed on in recent years in several new directions which are 
instructive to the anthropologist. Bradley wrote before the days of modern detailed research into 
Elizabethan beliefs, events and stage practices. This is true cultural study in the humanitarian 
tradition, and all such knowledge is essential for an understanding of Shakespeare’s plays. Such 
research compares, for instance, pirated texts in the early quartos with the texts of the folio 
collected edition; it studies the diaries and papers of a great Elizabethan theater owner in order to 
reconstruct the conditions under which the plays were produced. More than all, it describes the 
current ideas of Shakespearian times in science, history, morals and religion, both those accepted 
by the “groundlings” and those aired among the elite. As Dover Wilson has shown in his critical 
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edition of Hamlet, such a cultural study is crucial. Only with a knowledge of what the current 
ideas were about ghosts and their communications with their descendants can one judge what 
Shakespeare was saying in Hamlet; one can understand Hamlet’s relations with his mother only 
with an acquaintance with what incest was in Elizabethan times, and what it meant to contract an 
“o’erhasty marriage” where “the funeral baked meats did coldly furnish forth the marriage 
tables.” Carolyn Spurgeon’s and Dr. Armstrong’s examination of Shakespeare’s imagery is 
another kind of study from which an anthropologist can learn a technique useful in the study of 
comparative cultures. It can reveal symbolisms and free associations which fall into patterns and 
show processes congenial to the human mind in different cultures.
In all that I have said, I have emphasized the common ground which is shared by the 
humanities and by anthropology so soon as it includes the mind and behavior of men in its 
definition of culture. Let me emphasize again that the humanities provide only some of the 
answers to our problems in cultural studies; there are problems in the comparative study of 
societies with which they do not deal. Because anthropology, as a social science, organized its 
work to arrive at certain generalized, theoretical statements about culture, it has been able to 
make and document certain points in the Study of Man which the humanities did not make. My 
point is that, once anthropologists include the mind of man in their subject matter, the methods of 
science and the methods of the humanities complement each other. Any commitment to methods 
which exclude either approach is self-defeating. The humanists criticize the social sciences 
because they belabor the obvious and are arid; the social scientists criticize the humanities 
because they are subjective. It is not necessary for the anthropologist to be afraid of either 
criticism. The anthropologist can use both approaches. The adequate study of culture, our own 
and those on the opposite side of the globe, can press on to fulfillment only as we learn today 
from the humanities as well as from the sciences.
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